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Lawmakers around the world are now urging corporations
to adopt governance and executive pay standards drawn
largely from the American corporate law context. Yet little is
known about how corporate governance actually influences
executive compensation decisions outside of the United
States-and whether adoption of these standards is likely to
be desirable for investors abroad.
In this Article, we take advantage of a recent change in
Japanese law to provide the first direct empirical evidence on
executive pay in Japan. The evidence provides striking detail
on the amount and structure of Japanese executive
compensation. The data point to a previously unappreciated
link between corporate governance and executive pay in
Japan and indicate that several trends familiar to the U.S.
compensation landscape have begun to take hold in Japanese
firms. Our findings suggest that lawmakers and firms
should take careful account of the relationship between
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governance and pay before importing governance standards
from abroad.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the finance
ministers of all G-20 nations called on the Financial Stability
Board to propose global standards on compensation
structures that would govern the pay of bank executives
around the world.' Although the standards are limited by
their terms to banker pay, practitioners have made clear
that the G-20's call for convergence on compensation
practices has already had significant influence for firms
across the global economy.2 The standards draw heavily on
the U.S. experience with executive compensation, favoring
arrangements designed to address the agency problems that,
some have argued, influence pay at large American public
companies. Yet the standards, like most of the theoretical
literature developed by academics, do not take account of the
profound differences in corporate governance around the
world-and the potential influence of those differences on
executive pay.
In this Article, we contribute to the literature on the
relationship between governance and executive pay by
providing the first empirical evidence on the magnitude and
structure of the compensation packages of Japan's most
highly paid executives. Taking advantage of a recent change
in Japanese law that requires, for the first time, extensive
disclosure on the compensation of individual executives at
Japanese public firms, we develop a proprietary, hand-drawn
1 See FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 1 (2009).
2 CALVIN JOHNSON & KATY BENNETT, WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE,
EXECUTIVE PAY PRACTICES AROUND THE WORLD 3 (2009) (describing a
"thrust in recent years toward convergence [in] . . . executive pay
practices.").
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database including detail on the amounts and elements of
executive pay for Japan's highest-paid managers. The
evidence provides striking new detail on executive pay in
Japan-and new insights on the relationship between
corporate governance and top managers' compensation.
First, we find, consistent with previous work, that
Japanese managers generally receive considerably less total
pay than U.S. executives. Second, we find, also consistent
with previous work, that the structure of executive pay in
Japan relies far more heavily on payments unrelated to
performance, such as salary, than do pay structures in the
United States. But the closer look permitted by our data
suggests an important divergence in pay practices among
Japanese firms-depending on whether the firm features the
traditional Japanese corporate governance approach or a
committee-based structure more familiar to American
corporate law.
For example, we find that executives at firms governed in
the U.S. style receive far more pay in the form of
performance-based elements such as bonuses and stock
options than their counterparts at traditional firms. We also
find that the relationship between firm size and executive
pay-a relationship familiar to the U.S literature on
executive pay-is far less strong at traditionally governed
Japanese firms than it is at firms governed by committees.
Moreover, we find that at firms with traditional board
structures, the gap between the compensation of top
executives and the average member of the board of directors
is relatively small, and shrinks as the firm grows in size. By
contrast, at companies with committees, the gap between top
executives and the average director grows considerably along
with firm size.
Similarly, the influence of global markets in executive
services is a critical determinant of executive pay inside
Japan. On average, non-Japanese executives, whose pay is
determined by international trends in executive pay, earn
about forty percent more than Japanese executives, even
controlling for differences in firm size and performance. And
the structure of compensation is also profoundly influenced
[Vol. 2014COLUMBIA BUSINESS LA W REVIEW
by global pay practices. Non-Japanese executives receive
fifty percent more of their compensation in the form of stock
options in comparison to their Japanese counterparts.
On balance, our findings suggest a considerably more
nuanced pattern of Japanese pay practices than previous
analysis has exposed. Most intriguingly, we find preliminary
evidence that Japanese firms that have adopted U.S. board
structures have also adopted U.S. pay practices, if on a more
modest scale. We consider whether this trend may result
from simple endogeneity, signaling, familiarity with a
standard set of off-the-rack governance practices, or a causal
relationship between governance structures and executive
compensation.
Finally, our data provide new insights on the continuing
debates over the effects of rapid recent adoption of corporate
governance reforms in Japan. We conclude that the data are
inconsistent with the view that these reforms have had no
effect on the actual governance of Japanese public
companies. We also note, however, that the evidence
provides little support for the view that Japanese managers
have adopted with unambiguous zeal all of the features of
the shareholder-centric corporate governance model of the
United States.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the
relationship between corporate governance and executive
pay in the United States and Japan. Part III describes the
first direct evidence on top executives' pay in Japan. In Part
IV, we consider the implications of our findings for corporate
governance and executive compensation standards around
the world. Part IV concludes.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE
PAY
The bulk of the extensive literature on executive
compensation has focused on the pay bargains struck
between boards of directors and top executives at U.S. public
No. 1:1111 EXECUTIVE PAY IN JAPAN
companies.' Because stock ownership in these firms is
widely dispersed, each shareholder owns too small a stake to
make monitoring of directors worthwhile.' Moreover,
executives can influence whether directors retain their seats
on the board.5 Thus, there is an agency problem: director-
agents may have reason to favor executives' interests over
those of their shareholder-principals, skewing executive-pay
bargains away from optimal arrangements. 6 Extensive
empirical evidence on executive pay at U.S. public companies
has been marshalled in support of both positions.
By comparison, the pay-setting process in Japanese
corporations has received relatively little attention.
Traditionally, Japanese firms have been overseen by a board
of "statutory auditors" who provide relatively weak
constraints on insiders' influence over directors and their
bargains with executives over pay.7 More recently, however,
Japanese companies have been given the option to choose an
American-style governance system in which a committee of
independent directors is responsible for executive
compensation decisions.8 No previous work, however, has
evaluated empirically whether this governance choice is
3 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK
OF LABOR ECONoMiCs 2485, 2486 (Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Card eds.,
1999) (describing this literature and noting that growth in the number of
academic articles on executive pay has outpaced the growth of executive
compensation itself).
4 See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-92 (1986)
(describing shareholders' rational apathy).
5 For a forceful articulation of this point, see, for example, JAY W.
LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 20 (1989).
6 For the seminal articulation of agency problems in U.S. public
companies more generally, see generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)
(arguing that management and directors-by virtue of their day-to-day
involvement-have the ability to manage companies' resources to their
own advantage absent effective shareholder scrutiny).
7 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice As Regulatory
Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L.
343, 348 (2005).
8 Id. at 344.
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associated with different bargains over compensation for
Japan's top managers.
A. Theory and Evidence from the United States
At large U.S. public companies, directors bargaining over
executive pay must reconcile the competing interests of
shareholders and executives. Shareholders prefer that
managers be paid no more than is required to induce optimal
effort and that pay structures incentivize executives to
maximize shareholder wealth, for example through the use
of bonuses, grants of stock, or other arrangements that tie
pay to firm value. 9 Executives, on the other hand, prefer
compensation that is less risky, such as cash payments of
predetermined value."0 Whether the directors charged with
setting managers' compensation favor the interests of
executives over those of shareholders has been the subject of
considerable debate.
1. Competing Theories on Executive Pay
Scholars have focused on two potential theoretical
explanations for executive pay practices in the United
States. The first, sometimes called the "optimal contracting"
approach, holds that markets in capital, products, and
corporate control induce directors to pursue the executive-
pay deal that shareholders prefer.11 While proponents of this
view concede that markets may occasionally leave room for
executive-pay arrangements that depart from shareholder
preferences, in general, bargaining between directors and
executives produces the pay package that is in shareholders'
best interests.
9 For the classic articulation of this point, see Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
10 See STEVEN BALSAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 80 (2002).
11 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors'
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 543 (1984).
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Adherents of the second approach, the "managerial
power" view, contend that market forces are insufficient to
overcome the strong influence that top executives wield over
directors at large U.S. public companies.12 Among other
considerations, executives at U.S. public companies retain
some influence over whether a director is nominated for
reelection on the company proxy, and thus whether the
director is overwhelmingly likely to retain her seat on the
board.1 3 Meanwhile, these directors own very little of the
company's stock, and thus internalize very little of the costs
of executives' compensation. For directors, then, the costs of
capitulating to executives' pay demands are small, while the
costs of resisting those demands may be large. Thus, these
theorists argue, directors may approve executive-pay
packages that stray significantly from the optimal bargain
for shareholders.
Although the optimal-contracting view has long been the
dominant approach in financial economics, more recently the
managerial-power view has been increasingly cited as a basis
for regulatory change in the United States. For example, the
2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act requires that U.S. public companies provide
shareholders with a nonbinding vote on executive
compensation.' 4  Scholars taking the optimal-contracting
12 See, e.g., Richard A. Lambert et al., The Structure of Organizational
Incentives, 38 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 438, 441-42 (1993) (providing an early
description of this view); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 751, 764-65 (2002).
13 Nominees listed on the company's proxy statement are essentially
assured election, and although the principal U.S. securities exchanges
require those nominees to be selected by an independent committee, see
Orders Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Release No.
34-48108, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 (June 30, 2003), it is well-known that
executives nevertheless retain considerable influence over the identity of
the director nominees listed in the corporate proxy. See Martin Lipton,
The Millennium Bubble and Its Aftermath: Reforming Corporate America
and Getting Back to Business, M&A LAw., July-Aug. 2003, at 1, 4.
14 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 951, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012).
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view have argued forcefully that much empirical evidence on
executive pay cannot be explained by the managerial-power
theory, and thus that the prospect of executives' dominance




Executive pay in the United States has been the subject
of considerable empirical study, and this evidence has
repeatedly been marshalled in support of both the optimal-
contracting and managerial-power theories. 16  While both
sides of the debate over executive pay cite empirical work,
empirical study in this area has yielded at least three
important insights with which proponents of both schools
generally agree.
First, the empirical literature establishes that the
amount of the chief executive officer (CEO)'s compensation in
U.S. public companies is significantly positively correlated,
both economically and statistically, with firm size." And,
because the large American public company has grown
substantially during the last two decades, the magnitude of
CEO pay has also risen."8 While there is considerable debate
as to whether managerial power might also explain some of
the growth in CEO pay, most commentators appear to agree
15 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1630 (2005).
16 Compare, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
ch. 6 & n. 3 (citing John Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive
Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372-
73 (1999)), with Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 1630 (citing M. Todd
Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks,
Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L. J. 1835
(2005)).
17 See Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay
Increased So Much? 2 (MIT Dep't of Econ. Working Paper No. 06-13),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=901826.
18 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16, at 1.
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that growth in firm size explains at least some of the growth
in executive pay.19
Second, the literature makes clear that as the magnitude
of executive pay at large U.S. public companies has risen, the
link between pay and performance has also grown stronger.2 °
For example, standard measures used. in the financial
economics literature to estimate the effects of changes in
firm value on CEO wealth, such as the CEO's exposure to
the firm's stock price through ownership in stock and stock
options, have risen considerably.21
Finally, and far more controversially, the empirical
literature suggests that certain governance features may be
associated with the magnitude and structure of executive
pay. For example, one frequently-cited study of the
relationship between director characteristics and CEO pay in
the United States found that "CEO compensation is higher
when the CEO is also the board chair, the board is larger,
there is a greater percentage of the board composed of
outside directors, and the outside directors are appointed by
the CEO."22 A more recent study has similarly concluded
that board independence is a significant determinant of the
19 Compare Gabaix & Landier, supra note 17, at 2 (the "six-fold
increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the
six-fold increase in market capitalization of large U.S. companies" during
that period), with Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of
Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 283, 286 (2005) (concluding
that growth in executive pay between 1993 and 2003 cannot fully be
explained by the change in firm size during that period, and suggesting
that managerial power may explain the increase in pay).
20 See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q. J. ECON. 653, 671-73 (1998).
21 See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S.
CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1142, 1173 & tbl. 2 (2005) (providing evidence that the marginal
change in CEO wealth in large U.S. public companies in response to a
change in firm value increased by a factor of nearly four between 1993 and
2003).
22 John Core, Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, Corporate
Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance,
51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372 (1999).
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magnitude of CEO pay.23 Other work has identified a
connection between the strength of the pay-performance link
and corporate governance variables. One study, for example,
found that equity-based compensation, such as stock options
and grants of stock, is used more frequently in firms with
outside directors rather than directors appointed by the
CEO.2 4 Another concluded that the opportunistic timing of
stock-option grants in the United States, which undermined
the incentive effects of stock options awarded to executives,
was more common at firms whose boards were not comprised
by majority of independent directors.1
5
To be sure, the empirical literature remains divided on
the precise nature of the relationship between governance
and executive pay. And, of course, there has been little
reconciliation between the two principal schools of thought
on the determinants of executive pay at large U.S. public
companies. For many commentators, however, a nuanced
understanding of the governance features of the firm is
necessary to a complete analysis of the optimality of
executive pay arrangements from shareholders' point of
view. Unfortunately, however, the governance features of
Japanese corporations-and their implications for executive
compensation-have received relatively little attention.
B. The Institutional Environment for Executive Pay in
Japan
As a formal matter, Japanese corporate law charges the
board of directors with monitoring corporate activity and
making managerial decisions. In practice, however,
23 See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, CEO Compensation
and Board Structure, 64 J. FIN. 231, 232 (2009). But see Katherine
Guthrie et al., CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited, 67 J.
FIN. 1149 (2012) (concluding that the relationship between board structure
and CEO pay in Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra, was driven principally
by outliers).
24 See Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership,
and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 174 tbl. 3 (1995).
25 Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and
Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2365 (2010).
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Japanese boards have not emphasized their monitoring role.
This has been particularly true in companies that have
retained the traditional Japanese governance structure, in
which the board is ostensibly monitored by a group of
statutory auditors. More recently, however, Japanese law
has permitted boards to adopt a committee structure that
charges independent directors with negotiating
compensation for top executives.26
Previous empirical work has examined executive pay in
Japan only indirectly because of the limited disclosure of top
managers' compensation. Moreover, no previous empirical
work has considered whether governance choices are
associated with differences in executive pay. As we explain
below, however, a recent change in Japanese law offers the
first opportunity for empirical examination of those
questions.
1. Japanese Corporate Governance
As we have noted, Japanese boards of directors have
traditionally engaged in relatively little monitoring of
corporate management or their compensation." In Japan, it
has long been commonly understood that a few senior
directors enjoy ultimate decision-making authority within
the firm, rather than the board as a whole.2" Indeed, as
recently as the late 1990s, the limited influence of the board
of directors in Japanese corporate life led a blue ribbon panel
to wonder "whether the Japanese board of directors actually
complies with the Commercial Code's stipulation that it
function[] as the body which decides on corporate will and
exercises corporate oversight. 29
26 See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 353 (noting that Japan's
2002 reform allows firms the option to establish committees of the board
for audit, nomination, and compensation, which must have at least three
members, a majority of whom are outside directors).
27 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM OF JAPAN, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES-A JAPANESE VIEW (FINAL REPORT) 41-42 (1998).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 49.
[Vol. 2014
a. Traditional Structure
Influenced by the German supervisory board system,
most Japanese firms have an additional body, typically
referred to as a board of auditors (kansayaku), responsible
for overseeing the corporate board. Members of this board
are elected by the shareholders. Legally, the board of
auditors is charged with monitoring the board of directors'
compliance with law.30  Practically, however, the board of
auditors is a fairly weak corporate governance organ, 31 in
part as a result of its narrow mandate but also due to its
composition: many members of the board of auditors are
long-term employees whose service to the firm was
meritorious, but not distinctive enough to be rewarded with
a seat on the board of directors. The traditional board
structure of a Japanese firm (a "company-with-auditors," or
kansayaku secchi kaisha) is described in Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1: TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR
JAPANESE PUBLIC COMPANIES
Option 1: Traditional Governance Structure
Statutory Auditor System
t Sharchotmcr* Mecting
Election & [ F leetion &
Dismissal Dismissal




No outside directors required statutory auditors
requitred
This approach to governance has long shaped the defining
characteristics of the corporate board in Japan: deference to
managers and a lack of independent directors. Election to
the board in Japan has traditionally been viewed almost
exclusively as the crowning achievement in a long career
30 See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 348.
31 See id.
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with the firm that begins upon graduation from college. 2
Virtually all members of the board have come from the ranks
of senior management (typically one from each of the
company's major divisions). 3 In fact, until fairly recently,
Japanese corporate law did not recognize officers as distinct
corporate actors, suggesting that the concepts of director and
officer were indistinct. These practices reinforce the common
perception that the Japanese board closely identifies with
employees. Internal promotion is the norm even today.
Given this traditional view about the role of the board, it
is hardly surprising that independent directors have
historically played little role in Japanese corporate
governance. Outsiders with little firm-specific knowledge
are viewed as having little to contribute, and independent
judgment does not play a large role in Japanese
organizational dynamics. 34 As of 2010, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TSE) requires that each listed firm have at least
one independent director or statutory auditor. 5 As of March
2011, 2,146 TSE listed firms (93.5%) have secured at least
one independent director or auditor, but 75.5% of these are
independent outside auditors; only 24.5% are independent
outside directors.3 6 The average number of outside directors
per company is 0.91, and only 1.9% of TSE listed companies
32 See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 348-49.
33 See id. at 348.
34 Compare this to the major stock exchanges in the United States,
which now require the boards of listed firms to be comprised of a majority
of independent directors. See NEW YORK STOCK ExCH., LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 303A.01 (2013), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/
LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp 1_4&manual=%2Flcm%
2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F. In addition, the exchanges require that
compensation committees of such firms be comprised entirely of
independent directors. See id. at 303A.00. Tellingly, the legal term used
in Japan is "outside" director (shagai torishimariyaku), rather than
"independent" director. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 358.
35 Independence means an "outside [director] who is unlikely to have
conflicts of interest with general investors." TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC.,
TSE-LSTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 39
(2011) [hereinafter TSE WHITE PAPER].
36 See id. at 39-40.
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have a majority of outside directors." These recent data
suggest a continuing reluctance on the part of most Japanese
firms to bring outsiders into the boardroom.
b. Committee Structure
More recently, however, Japanese corporate law has
created additional potential roles for non-executive directors.
In 2002, a new Company Law codified a menu of board
structure options that was enacted in the early 2000s.
3 8
Japanese companies today have two options in regard to
board structure: they may retain the traditional board
structure just discussed or, alternatively, they can adopt a
committee system modeled after U.S. corporate law and
practice (a "company-with-committees," iinkai secchi
kaisha) 9 Under the committee system, the board must
have compensation, nomination, and audit committees. And
a company opting for this structure must have a majority of
"outside" directors serving on each of the three mandatory
committees.4 ° Companies-with-committees have U.S.-style
corporate officers, and are permitted to delegate corporate
decisions to committees of the board. Figure 2 illustrates the
committee structure in Japanese firms:
37 See TSE WHITE PAPER at 19-20.
38 See THE POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS: SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL





FIGURE 2: COMMITTEE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR
JAPANESE PUBLIC COMPANIES





Committee Members / B




ElectionfDisMiss I A Ceoeittee
Audit/ ElecfionffDismis.sal
Determination of Audit/
Compensation CompesaionF Determination of Compensation
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I) Majority of each committee must consist of "outside" directors
2) Directors can also serve as Fxecmutive Officers (except diectors on Audit Couittee)
Overwhelmingly, publicly listed Japanese firms have
chosen to retain the traditional auditor system.41 In total,
only 112 publicly traded Japanese firms had adopted the
committee system as of April 2009.42 It is not surprising,
then, that relatively little empirical attention has been given
to the governance structure of Japanese public companies.
And no previous work has provided evidence on the
relationship between board structure and executive pay
bargains in Japan.
2. Empirical Study of Executive Pay in Japan
Until recently, Japanese law required no disclosure of
individual executives' pay, limiting empirical study in this
41 As of March 2011, 97.8% of all TSE-listed firms are companies-
with-auditors; only 2.2% are companies with committees. See TSE WHITE
PAPER, supra note 35, at 15.
42 See Robert N. Eberhart, Corporate Governance Systems and Firm
Value: Empirical Evidence from Japan's Natural Experiment, 6 J. ASIA
Bus. STUD. 176, 178 (2012).
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area. Previous work indirectly examined Japanese executive
pay, for example on the basis of the aggregate pay for the
entire board of directors 43 or estimates of compensation
drawn from income tax returns." But a recent change in
Japanese corporate law now offers the first opportunity to
directly measure top executives' pay-and the relationship
between executive pay and corporate governance.
In March 2010, Japan's Financial Services Agency (FSA)
revised the disclosure requirements for listed companies
relating to executive compensation.45 Prior to the revision,
Japanese listed companies were required to disclose, and
obtain annual shareholder approval of, the total amount of
compensation to be paid to the board of directors as a whole.
But no disclosure of individual director-level compensation
was required.46  Today, however, the revised disclosure
ordinance requires listed companies to disclose detailed
compensation information for each executive whose total
compensation for the relevant fiscal year is Y100 million or
more (approximately $1 million, at current exchange rates).47
The disclosure must describe both the total amount of
compensation and the individual components of
compensation (salary, bonus, stock options, and "other
43 See Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm
Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States, 102 J. POL.
ECON. 510, 534 (1994).
44 See Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen,
Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants
from Tax Records, 20 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 843 (2011); Takao Kato
& Mark Rockel, Experiences, Credentials, and Compensation in the
Japanese and U.S. Managerial Labor Markets: Evidence from New Micro
Data, 6 J. JAPANESE & INT'L ECONOMIES 30, 32 (1992).
45 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Japan's Executives to Reveal






compensation," which generally consists of retirement pay)
for each executive.48
The FSA's revision to the compensation disclosure regime
was a bolt out of the blue for corporate Japan. Why the
sudden change? To be sure, Japanese corporate governance
practices have faced a steady stream of criticism over the
past decade as a result of the country's economic malaise and
protracted stock market slump.49 Yet few, if any, of these
criticisms were directed at executive pay practices at
Japanese firms. Although some reformers had concluded as
early as 2009 that additional disclosure of executive pay was
needed, those proposals did not include mandating that
companies reveal individual executives' pay packages. °
48 Wakabayashi, supra note 45. For purposes of the ordinance, "board
member" includes both executives and "outside" directors, as well as
"statutory auditors." See supra text accompanying notes 28-33. For ease
of exposition, in this Article we will simply refer to the individuals subject
to compensation disclosure as "executives."
49 Although compensation practices at Japanese firms have not been
the focus of these criticisms, several reports issued by corporate
governance organizations in 2008 did recommend disclosures of individual
executive pay packages as one of many potential governance reforms. See
ASIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASS'N, WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 21 (Jamie Allen et al. eds., 2008); PENSION FUND
ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2010); TOKYO STOCK
EXCH., OPINION SUMMARIES RECEIVED FROM INVESTORS IN RESPONSE TO
LISTED COMPANY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INVESTOR 21
(2008).
50 Two organizations-the Corporate Governance Study Group, under
the auspices of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the
Financial System Council's Study Group on the Internationalization of
Japanese Financial and Capital Markets under the auspices of the FSA-
considered whether executive-compensation reforms were needed in Japan
during this period. MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS., CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE STUDY GRP., THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY GROUP
REPORT 4-5 (2009); FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, REPORT BY THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
COUNCIL'S STUDY GROUP ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JAPANESE
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKETS 14 (2009). But the final reports of both
groups, released in June 2009, recommended only better disclosure of
"existing executive remuneration policies" and a breakdown of the types of
incentives provided to executives. Id. Thus, while compensation-related
disclosure was an item on reformers' agendas, as of mid-2009 there was no
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Two unexpected catalysts coalesced to change the
regulatory dynamic: the global financial crisis and the
election of a new government in Japan. First, the financial
crisis elevated the political salience of executive
compensation worldwide. In Japan, critics focused attention
on the gap between the salaries of top managers and average
employees, and the large cash reserves maintained by many
public companies that, it was asserted, should be used to pay
higher salaries to workers. Second, when the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) defeated the conservative Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) with the help of labor unions in
August 2009, the stage was set for government action. The
DPJ, an odd-bedfellows mixture of socialists and breakaway
members of the LDP, advanced both pro-labor and anti-
bureaucracy policies in its campaign. 51  Since executive
compensation in Japan had become linked in the public
debate to board practices such as large retained earnings
and low dividend payout ratios-salient to both labor unions
and investors-it was a politically useful issue for the DPJ.
5 2
In February 2010, six months after the change in
government, the FSA released its proposed amendment to
the disclosure regime for public comment.53 Not only was the
concept of individual director-level disclosure completely
unanticipated by the market, the threshold of Y100 million
movement in official policy circles to require disclosure of individual pay
packages.
51 See Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan's Victors Set to Abandon Market
Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at Al.
52 Unlike in the United States, where the level of executive pay and
the link between pay and performance have motivated significant recent
regulatory change in corporate governance, see Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Private Equity and Executive Compensation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 638, 665-66
(2013), these considerations did not appear to be among the central
motivations for Japanese policymakers in adopting this new regime. As
we explain below, see infra Part IV.C, for this reason the Japanese
disclosure regime does not currently provide investors, regulators or
researchers with the data necessary for comprehensive analysis of top
executives' pay.
53 Press Release, Fin. Servs. Agency, Proposal of Disclosure Items
Concerning Corporate Governance (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2010/20 100219-2.html.
No. 1:1111 EXECUT1IVE PAY IN JAPAN
specified in the draft ordinance had no independent
significance in the Japanese system of executive
compensation.
Despite significant criticisms of the process leading to its
development-and its substance-the ordinance took effect
without significant change in March 2010.1' Because
Japanese firms did not anticipate this development, they
lacked adequate time to alter their compensation
arrangements in anticipation of the rule change, for
example, to shield executives from the new disclosure
obligation. Thus, this change in law provides a rare and
highly reliable picture of Japanese compensation practices as
of early 2010.
III. EVIDENCE ON EXECUTIVE PAY IN JAPAN
In this Part, we present the first detailed, direct evidence
on the compensation of Japan's most highly paid executives.
First, we provide summary statistics describing the data
available from the first year of disclosure under these new
rules. We then offer preliminary analysis of this new
evidence. While some of our analysis confirms the
predictions of previous work, our data present some
surprises-and offer a far more nuanced view of the
dynamics that determine top executives' pay in Japan than
past scholarship has provided.
At a summary level-and consistent with previous
work-the data show that Japan's top earners are paid
significantly less than the most highly compensated
managers in the United States.5 But a closer look provides
preliminary evidence of a previously unexplored relationship
between governance and executive pay in Japan. For
example, while companies-with-auditors provide most pay in
the form of fixed payments like salary, companies-with-
committees have adopted a compensation structure far more
54 See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Agency, Disclosure Items Concerning
Corporate Governance, (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.fsa.go.jplen/news/
2010/20100326-1.html.
55 See Kaplan, supra note 43, at 536.
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familiar in the United States, relying more heavily on
performance-based payments like bonuses and stock options.
At companies with auditors, firm size is a relatively weak
determinant of top executives' total pay. By contrast, at
companies with committees, firm size is a far more
important predictor of executive pay, consistent with the
U.S. literature on executive compensation. Taken together,
the preliminary evidence suggests that Japanese firms that
have adopted a committee-based board structure have
similarly adopted pay practices resembling those at large
U.S. public companies.
Although governance choices are associated with
significant differences in executive pay in Japan, we find
that governance is not the sole determinant of top managers'
compensation. Foreign executives, we find, earn
substantially more compensation than other managers,
although on average they are younger than Japanese
executives and have shorter tenure on the board of directors.
Moreover, foreigners' compensation relies far more heavily
on performance-based payments, like bonuses and stock
options, than Japanese executives' pay.
Finally, the evidence shows that Japan's top earners
include a substantial number of firm founders. And, while
our evidence is generally consistent with previous work
concluding that Japanese executives own relatively small
amounts of stock in their firms, we find that the founders in
our sample own substantial stakes in their companies-
pointing to a previously unknown link between pay and
performance in Japan.
A. Methodology and Summary Statistics
In June 2010, as required by the FSA's new ordinance,
152 Japanese public companies disclosed that they employed
executives who earned in excess of Y100 million in the
previous year. Many of the firms were among Japan's
largest public companies; the median market capitalization
among the firms subject to the revised ordinance was more
than Y193 billion. Many firms were among Japan's best-
known public companies, including Sony, Nissan, Mitsubishi,
No. 1:111]
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Panasonic and Toyota. 56 But the list of firms with disclosing
executives also includes far smaller and less well-known
firms such as Stella Chemifa and Nac Co.
Together, these 152 firms disclosed detailed information
on the compensation of the 269 Japanese executives who
earned more than ¥100 million in the previous year. We
constructed a hand-drawn dataset including information on
salary, bonus, stock options, retirement benefits, and other
compensation paid to each individual, as well as the stock
ownership and tenure of each individual executive.57 Using
biographical information included in the Yuka Shoken
Hokokushko-the Japanese equivalent of the Form 10-K in
the United States-we also collected data indicating whether
the executive was a founder of the company or a non-
Japanese serving as an executive at a Japanese firm.58
Table 1 below provides summary information on the
compensation and characteristics of the executives subject to
Japan's new compensation disclosure regime in 2010.
56 A compendium of the firms required to disclose executives'
compensation in 2010 is included in the Appendix. See infra Table 1.
57 We are grateful to Oakaya Seki of Corporate Practice Partners,
Inc., and Yoshiko Habe, of the Columbia Law School LL.M. class of 2011,
for their assistance in constructing this dataset.
58 On the basis of our review of the Yuka Shoken Hokokushko, we
identified founders as managers who participated in the founding of the
firm, whether or not the executive continues to retain substantial
ownership. We separately identified foreign executives as those without
Japanese family names whose prior experience consisted principally of
employment in countries other than Japan. Coding these distinctions was
generally straightforward on the basis of the information included in the
Yuka Shoken Hokokushko.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS: INDIVIDUAL EXECUTIVES
Median Age 64
Median Tenure (years)59  16
Median Salary Y93,000,000
Median Bonus Y27,000,000





At a summary level, our evidence on the compensation of
individual executives in Japan is generally consistent with
previous work on Japanese managers' pay. For example,
with respect to total pay levels, the data are consistent with
prior work indicating that top Japanese executives earn
considerably less total compensation and own smaller
proportions of their firms' stock than their U.S.
counterparts.6 0  The median executive among Japan's 269
most highly paid managers earned Y135 million in total
compensation in 2010 (approximately $1.48 million at the
then-prevailing exchange rate). By contrast, among the 269
most highly paid executives in the United States in 2010, the
median manager's total compensation was approximately ten
times greater, at about $16.7 million."
59 Throughout this Article, we use the term "tenure" to refer to the
number of years between the date on which the executive took his or her
seat on the company's board of directors or board of statutory auditors and
the end of 2010.
60 See Kato & Rockel, supra note 44, at 33.
61 This figure was calculated by drawing annualized compensation
data for all U.S. executives whose compensation was required to be
disclosed in 2010, ranking the managers by total compensation disclosed
pursuant to U.S. disclosure rules, see 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2013), and
calculating the median compensation for the 269 highest-paid managers
by that measure. See COMPUSTAT, EXEcUCOMP ANNUAL COMPENSATION
DATASET, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu (last accessed Sept. 17,
2012); see also WRDS FAQs, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/
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This is not to say that all executives at Japanese firms
receive relatively low levels of pay. Japan's top earner that
year, Carlos Ghosn of Nissan, earned ¥891 million, or about
$9.8 million, in 2010. The next most highly paid executive,
Howard Stringer of Sony Corporation, earned Y814 million,
or approximately $8.9 million. Nor were high amounts of
total compensation limited to foreigners: Japan's third
highest-paid executive, Yoshitoshi Kitajima of Dai Nippon
Printing Co., earned ¥787 million, or about $8.6 million.
Moreover, for many firms, the disclosures were not
limited to a single highly paid executive. Several of Japan's
most well-known corporations were required to disclose
compensation details for more than one executive. Table 2
below describes the public companies required to disclose
compensation for the largest number of individuals during
the first year that Japan's revised ordinance was in effect:
wrds/aboutWRDS%20FAQs.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). Our finding
that average pay is statistically significantly higher for the U.S. executives
than for their Japanese counterparts is robust to controls for executives'
incentives, including their stock ownership, as well as controls for firm
size and Tobin's Q.
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS: FIRMS DISCLOSING
COMPENSATION FOR MULTIPLE EXECUTIVES




Earning (Nomura Corporation, 3241 millionMoreThan Sony Corporati n, and




Earning Daiwa Securities, 3136 million
More Than Nintendo Co., and
3100M Fanuc)
Five
ExecutivesEarnig (Mitsubishi, Nippon 3145 million
EarenTn Sheet Glass, and
More Than Softbank Corporation.)
Y100M
Four
ExecutivesEarnuigs (Dai Nippon PrintingEarning CoTyta3n 177 million
Co., Toyota, and
More Than Shinsei Bank)
Y100M II
But summary data like these, however intriguing, only
scratch the surface of the detail offered by Japan's new
disclosure regime. Because the revised ordinance also
requires disclosure of the elements of each executive's pay,
we can evaluate for the first time the structure of Japanese
executives' compensation. Combining these disclosures with
detail on governance structure, we can also consider the
relationship between executive pay and corporate
governance in Japan.
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B. Corporate Governance and Executive Pay
Previous work has explored whether corporate
governance in Japan is an important explanatory factor with
respect to firm value.62 In this section, we assess whether
the structure and amount of executive pay in Japan is
associated with a Japanese firm's choice between the
statutory-auditor or committee-style board structure.
As we have noted, a common theme in the U.S. literature
on executive pay is that compensation committees comprised
of independent directors are likely to drive a harder bargain
with top executives, resulting in pay arrangements more
closely aligned with shareholder interests.63 Do Japanese
boards that have chosen the committee structure-and, thus,
have "independent" compensation committees comprised
mostly of outside directors-obtain a different bargain over
executive pay than traditional Japanese boards?
Among the 152 firms required to disclose individual
executives' pay in 2010, 141, or 93%, retained the traditional
auditor structure, while just 11, or 7%, had adopted
committees. Table 3 below summarizes the characteristics of
each group of firms:
62 See Eberhart, supra note 42; see also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note
7, at 343.
63 See Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra note 23, at 232.
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TABLE 3: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE
64
Firms with Firms with
Auditors Committees
(N = 141) (N = 11)
Average Percentage of 35.0% 45.0%**
Sales from Outside Japan
Average Percentage of
Shares Owned by Japanese 35.0% 27.8%***
Corporations and Banks
Average Percentage of
Shares Owned by 24.8% 40.0%***
Foreign Investors
Average Fraction of Firms
with Foreigners on the 5.7% 63.6%***
Board
Average Number of Outside 1.2
Directors
Average Tobin's Q 1.15 0.9
Average Market Y1.3 billion V1.5 billion
Capitalization
As Table 3 shows, the firms in our sample that have
selected the committee structure generally depend more on
international markets for revenues, investors, and directors
than the firms that have retained the statutory-auditor
64 Throughout this Part, we use the standard identifiers of statistical
significance for differences among means: "***" indicates significance at
99% confidence, "*" indicates significance at 95% confidence, and "'"
indicates significance at 90% confidence. In Tables III and IV, these
identifiers refer to the correlation coefficient for a dummy variable
indicating whether the firm has a committee or statutory auditor structure
in a regression also controlling for the firm's industry and firm value as
measured by Tobin's Q, or the ratio of the firm's market value to the book
value of its assets. Tobin's Q is a commonly used measure for determining
the effectiveness with which corporate management convert assets into
equity value. See James Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to
Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969).
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structure. Indeed, the committee firms include some of
Japan's most recognizable brands, such as Toshiba, Sony and
Nomura. A much larger fraction of these firms also feature
foreign directors, and unsurprisingly the firms also have
more independent directors. But the two groups include
firms that are generally of comparable value, as measured by
Tobin's Q, and size, as measured by market capitalization.
How do the executives subject to the new disclosure
regime at firms with committees compare with executives at
more traditionally governed Japanese companies? Table 4
below summarizes the characteristics of the executives in
our dataset at each type of firm:
TABLE 4: EXECUTIVE CHARACTERISTICS BY GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE
Executives at Executives at Firms
Firms with Auditors with Committees
(N=234) (N = 35)
Average Age 63.6 58.8***
Average Tenure
on the Board of 21.2 10.9***
Directors
Average TotalCmesaTto ¥165 million Y173 millionCompensation
As Table 4 shows, the characteristics of the executives at
firms with statutory auditors differ significantly from the
executives at firms with committees. Executives at
companies that have retained the statutory-auditor structure
are statistically significantly older than their counterparts at
firms with committees, and on average they have served on
the corporate board for twice as long. Despite these
differences, however, the magnitude of compensation is
statistically similar for executives at the two groups of firms.
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1. Compensation Structure
Japan's new disclosure regime permits us to evaluate not
only the magnitude of compensation but also its structure.
Table 5 below summarizes the average percentage of total
compensation attributable to each element of pay for
executives at firms with committees and firms with auditors,
respectively:
TABLE 5: COMPENSATION STRUCTURES FOR HIGHLY PAID











with 62% 13% 6% 7% 1%
Auditors
(N = 234) 1 1 1 1 1_ J
Table 5 suggests that compensation structures for
executives at firms with committees are more closely tied to
performance than pay for executives at firms with statutory
auditors.66 On average, the highest-paid executives at firms
65 In Table 5, indicators of significance refer to simple t-tests for
differences between means.
66 Coding with respect to whether a particular firm uses a statutory-
auditor or committee structure was based on the governance structure
described in each firm's disclosures. Further research, however, revealed
that two firms that described themselves as statutory-auditor firms,
Shinsei Bank Ltd. and Columbia Music Entertainment, changed from the
committee to statutory-auditor structure just before they were required to
disclose their governance arrangements. Because compensation
structures, which must be determined well in advance of these disclosures,
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with committees receive some forty percent of their
compensation in performance-sensitive payments such as
bonuses and stock options.67 By contrast, top managers at
firms with statutory auditors receive less than twenty
percent of their compensation in those forms.68
Of course, as we have noted, these differences in
compensation structure may be attributable to the other
differences we have described between the groups of
statutory-auditor and committee firms. In particular, these
differences could be related to the significantly greater
incidence of non-Japanese executives in firms that have
adopted the committee structure than in traditional
statutory-auditor firms, or alternatively the significantly
greater incidence of founding executives in firms that have
retained the statutory-auditor structure. Thus, we
recalculated the results in Table 5 in separate analyses that
were likely set by committees rather than statutory auditors, we recoded
our dataset to characterize these firms as committee firms rather than
statutory-auditor firms. Our results were unchanged, and indeed the
regression models described in the Appendix yielded correlation
coefficients between governance structures and compensation structures of
greater economic and statistical significance. We generally report our
results based on the two firms' disclosed governance structures, but
changing their coding in this way would not meaningfully affect our
results.
67 While previous work on executive compensation in the United
States has suggested that bonuses do not succeed in linking pay to
performance, see Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay
and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 251 (1990), we
include bonuses in the calculation of performance-sensitive pay for
Japanese managers because firms' disclosures suggest that these bonuses
depend significantly on performance measures.
68 Executives at firms with statutory auditors and those at companies
with committees appear to receive similar fractions of their pay in the
form of "other" compensation such as perquisites; on average, Japan's
highest-paid executives receive only about one percent of their pay in this
form. Perquisites therefore appear to reflect a smaller proportion of top
executives' pay in Japan than in the United States and Europe. See, e.g.,
SUBODH MISHRA, ISS CORPORATE SERVS., STOCKING UP: POST-CRISIS TRENDS
IN U.S. EXECUTIVE PAY 2 (2012) (reporting that perquisites represent, on
average, approximately eighteen percent of total compensation in the
United States).
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exclude, in turn, non-Japanese executives and founders from
the dataset. Our results were unchanged.69
Moreover, executives at firms that retained the statutory-
auditor structure have significantly longer tenure than their
counterparts at companies with committees. This finding is
consistent with prior work arguing that traditionally
Japanese executives receive more certain compensation over
long tenure with the firm-in contrast to American
executives, who, as victors of the internal talent tournament
in a firm owned by dispersed shareholders, receive larger
pay packages designed to align compensation with
performance, but generally enjoy shorter tenure.7 ° Our
evidence is consistent with that literature. The executives in
our sample who have served on the board longer than the
sample's median tenure of sixteen years receive, on average,
fourteen percent of their pay in the form of performance-
based compensation such as stock options and bonuses. By
contrast, executives with less than the median tenure receive
twenty-nine percent of their compensation in performance
pay.
In light of these important executive-level differences, in
the Appendix we subject the trend in Table 5 to regression
analysis controlling for, among other things, differences in
firm characteristics such as size, industry, and firm value, as
well as executive-specific differences, including variables
69 The differences between pay structures for executives at firms with
statutory auditors and those at firms with committees described in Table 5
are virtually unchanged when the data are adjusted to remove foreigners.
Excluding foreigners, executives at firms with auditors received on
average 63% of their compensation in salary, 13% in bonuses, and 6% in
stock options, while executives at firms with committees received 54% of
their compensation in salary, 30% in bonuses, and 9% in stock options.
Similarly, the results are not changed when founders are excluded.
Excluding founders, executives at firms with auditors received on average
60% of their compensation in salary, 15% in bonuses, and 8% in stock
options, while executives at firms with committees received 53% of their
compensation in salary, 27% in bonuses, and 9% in stock options.
70 See Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay
Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1211-16
(2004).
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indicating whether the executive is a foreigner or founder
along with controls for age and tenure. Both tests confirm
that the percentage of compensation attributable to
performance-based pay is statistically significantly greater
for executives at companies with committees.
2. Compensation and Firm Size
Previous work has found that the average director's
compensation in Japan increases with firm size, a conclusion
consistent with the finding in the broader literature that
higher levels of executive pay are associated with increased
firm size. 7' Our data, too, show that the average director's
compensation increases with firm size. But our individual-
level data on executive pay in Japan suggest that firms'
governance choices provide critical context for assessing the
relationship between firm size and compensation levels.
Table 6 below summarizes the compensation levels of
Japan's most highly paid executives according to firm size
and the firms' governance structures:
TABLE 6: AVERAGE TOTAL COMPENSATION OF HIGHEST-PAID
JAPANESE EXECUTIVES, BY FIRM SIZE
Bottom Three Top Quartile of
Quartiles of Firm Size
Firm Size
Average Total Executive
Pay at Firms withCommites whY140 million ¥198 million**Committees
(N = 35)
Average Total Executive
Pay at Firms withSty ators Auitor 171 million Y156 millionStatutory Auditors
(N = 234)
71 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 43, at 540 (finding that the average
Japanese director's compensation rises with firm size); Bebchuk &
Grinstein, supra note 19, at 284 (describing the extensive literature
establishing the relationship between pay levels and firm size).
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As Table 6 shows, among Japan's top executives, the
relationship between total pay levels and firm size depends,
in part, on the firm's governance structure. 72 Among firms
with the traditional statutory auditor structure, firm size
has relatively little predictive power with respect to pay
levels. By contrast, among firms with committee structures,
firm size is strongly correlated with the magnitude of top
executives' compensation-a result consistent with the
literature on executive pay in the United States.
3. Pay Equity Inside the Japanese Boardroom
The first examination of the compensation of individual
Japanese executives also allows us to compare differences
between top executives' pay and the compensation received
by the average director at that executive's firm. As we have
previously noted, the median executive in our sample earned
¥135 million during the fiscal year ending in 2010. By
comparison, the average director at the median firm in our
sample earned ¥47 million. The median gap between the
disclosed pay for top executives and the average director at
that executive's firm is ¥91 million. At least for firms
72 In Table 6, indicators of statistical significance refer to the
correlation coefficient for firm size in a regression also controlling for
industry and firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We present in Table
6 the results for all 269 executives in our sample, which includes more
than one executive at several firms, see supra text accompanying note 61
& tbl. 2. When we limit our analysis only to the highest-paid individual at
each firm, as in previous work, see Nakazato et al., supra note 44, at 865,
869 tbl. V, we find a positive and statistically significant (at the 95%
confidence level) relationship between firm size and total compensation,
both at firms with committees and firms with statutory auditors. The
magnitude of the firm-size effect, however, is far more economically
significant for companies with committees; in those firms, the top
executive at the largest quartile of firms on average earns more than three
times the top executives at smaller firms, while at companies with
statutory auditors the average top executive at the largest quartile of
firms earns approximately 38% more than the top executive at smaller
firms. Moreover, in unreported analysis we find that the correlation
coefficient for firm size is statistically significantly larger for companies
with committees than at companies with statutory auditors.
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required to disclose the compensation of their most highly
paid executive(s), the top earner(s) appear to earn far more-
approximately three times as much-as their colleagues in
the boardroom.
A closer look at the data, however, reveals an important
interaction between the gap between executive and director
pay, firm size, and Japanese corporate governance. For
firms that have retained the statutory-auditor structure, the
compensation gap between top executives and their director
colleagues narrows as firm size increases. By contrast, for
companies-with-committees, this gap grows quite
substantially as firm size increases. Table 7 below
summarizes the gap between compensation for the highest-
paid executives and average directors in Japan, conditional
on firm size and governance structure:
TABLE 7: DIFFERENCES IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN
JAPANESE EXECUTIVES AND DIRECTORS
73
Bottom Three Top Quartile
Quartiles of of Firm Size
Firm Size
Average Executive-





Firms with Statutory Y120 million Y80 million
Auditors
(N = 234)
73 In Table 7, indicators of significance refer to the correlation
coefficient for firm size in a regression in which the independent variable
is the gap between the disclosed executive's compensation and the average
compensation of a director at that executive's firm, controlling for
industry, firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q), and whether the
individual executive is a foreigner or founder.
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For firms with statutory auditors, Table 7 confirms our
previous finding that firm size is a relatively unimportant
determinant of top executives' pay-even though, consistent
with the previous literature, the average director's
compensation increases along with the size of the firm. For
firms with committees, however, firm size is an important
determinant of top executives' compensation-and, thus, as
firm size rises, so does the gap between the compensation of
top executives and that of the average director. This result
does not appear to be associated strictly with particular
executive characteristics. When we subject the results in
Table 7 to multivariate analysis, we find that the results are
robust to additional executive-level controls-for example,
for whether the executive is a foreigner or founder 74 -and
that more extensive regression analysis confirms the
findings in Table 7.75
Taken together, the evidence suggests an important
relationship between Japanese firms' governance structure
and executive compensation. Firms that have adopted the
committee structure, which are more exposed to
international markets and more likely to feature foreigners
in the boardroom, have adopted practices consistent with the
literature on executive pay in the United States. These
firms pay much larger proportions of compensation in
74 Among the thirty-five executives at firms with committees, seven
were foreigners and two were founders. Controlling for these executive-
level characteristics did not change the results described in Table 7.
Indeed, although multivariate models without these controls revealed a
statistically significant relationship between firm size and the executive-
director pay gap among companies with committees, the economic and
statistical significance of that finding was strengthened when controlling
for individual executives' status as foreigners or founders.
75 In the Appendix, we further explore the relationship identified in
Table 7 by examining whether an interaction term between firm size and
corporate governance is a statistically meaningfully determinant of the
gap between top executives' pay and the average director's compensation.
We find, consistent with Table 7, that a dummy variable indicating that
the firm features the company-with-committees structure is statistically
and economically significantly related to the relationship between firm
size and pay equity in the Japanese boardroom. See infra Table II.
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bonuses and stock options-and pay more total
compensation to executives at the helm of larger firms in
comparison to other managers.
By contrast, firms that have retained the traditional
statutory-auditor structure appear to compensate top
managers in strikingly different fashion, relying on long
board tenure rather than performance-based compensation
to reward executives. And, at these firms, the total level of
compensation appears to be subject to an informal upper
bound that directors carefully observe. Thus, even as
increases in firm size justify higher pay for other members of
the board, top executives whose compensation is already
approaching this upper limit do not receive further increases
in pay.
C. Foreign Executives
Twenty-one executives, or about eight percent of the
managers in our sample, are non-Japanese serving as
executives at a Japanese public company. Because a foreign
executive's compensation may be influenced by pay practices
outside Japan, we separately evaluated the characteristics
and compensation of the foreign executives in our sample.
Table 8 below provides summary statistics describing the
foreign executives whose compensation was disclosed under
the new ordinance in 2010:
TABLE 8: SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS: FOREIGN EXECUTIVES
Non-Japanese Japanese
Executives Executives
Median Age 53 64
Median Tenure 6 17
Median FirmMeae Citi Y832 billion Y623 billionMarket CapitalizationII
As Table 8 shows, the foreign executives among Japan's
top earners are younger than their Japanese counterparts,
have served on the company's board for shorter periods of
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time, and generally run larger companies. How does the
compensation of foreign executives differ from that of
Japanese managers? Table 9 compares the total
compensation of foreign executives to that of their Japanese
counterparts:





Total Y230 million*** Y161 million
Compensation
Percentage of
Compensation Paid 9.4%*** 6.0%
in Stock Options I _I
Table 9 gives striking evidence of the relationship
between an executive's nationality and his compensation.
Among Japan's most highly paid executives, non-Japanese
earn over forty percent more than Japanese managers.
Moreover, foreigners receive a statistically and economically
significantly greater proportion of their pay in the form of
stock options. We subjected these results to multivariate
regression analysis controlling for the firm's governance
structure, along with variations in firm size and industry as
well as the executives' age and tenure. 77 The results in Table
76 In Table 9, indicators of statistical significance refer to the
correlation coefficient for a dummy variable indicating whether the
executive is a foreigner in a regression also controlling for age, tenure,
governance structure, and firm size, expressed as the log of the firm's
market capitalization.
77 This analysis allows us to address the possibility that the higher
pay we find for non-Japanese managers is related to the managers' status
as newly hired executives rather than their non-Japanese status. On
average, the non-Japanese executives in our dataset have served on their
company's board of directors for more than eleven years, so it is unlikely
that the timing of their hiring influences their pay level. Moreover, the
multivariate regression models described in the Appendix control for each
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9 were robust to those tests. Foreign executives at Japanese
firms earn far more-and receive much larger proportions of
their pay in the form of stock options-than their Japanese
counterparts.
D. Founding Executives
We identified seventy-seven executives, or about twenty-
nine percent of the managers in our sample, as founders.
The overwhelming majority of these founder-executives sit
on boards of directors that have retained the traditional
statutory-auditor governance structure. Table 10 below
summarizes the distribution of founders among the 152
firms in our sample:
TABLE 10: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY FOUNDER STATUS
Firms with Firms with
Auditors Committees
(N=141) (N=11)
Number of Firms 75 2
With Founders
(Percentage of Firms) ( (1I
Among the seventy-seven founders in our sample,
seventy-five are at firms with statutory auditors; indeed,
only two founders in our sample are at firms that have
elected to adopt the committee structure.78  Plausibly,
founders overwhelmingly avoid the committee structure
because it is perceived to entail dilution of the founder's
control (since at least two independent directors are needed
to serve on the required committees). Since founders are so
prominent in our sample-and are unevenly distributed
executive's tenure, and the results described in Table 9 are robust to those
controls-indicating that a manager's status as a foreigner has an
independent relationship with the level of her pay. We are grateful to
Mariana Pargendler for suggesting this analysis.
78 These executives are Haruo Naito of Eisai and Hiroshi Suzuki of
Hoya Corporation.
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between firms that retained the statutory-auditor structure
and those that adopted committees-we performed the
analysis described earlier in this Part while controlling for
founders or simply excluding all founders from our sample.
The results were unchanged].
9
Because the literature on executive pay suggests that
founders' influence over the board and their firms more
generally may lead to differences in their compensation,80 we
separately explored potential differences in the
compensation and incentives of the founding executives
subject to Japan's new disclosure regime. Table 11 below
summarizes the characteristics of the founders in our
sample:




Median Age 62 64
Median Tenure 29 12**
As Table 11 shows, although the founding executives in
our sample are slightly younger than non-founders, they
79 Outside the Japanese context, prior literature has argued that
there are significant differences in governance and compensation at
founder firms. See John C. Coates IV & Reinier Kraakman, CEO Tenure,
Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies (Harvard Law Sch.
John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series No.
595, 2007) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1383&context=harvardolin. Thus, we ran the analysis described
in this Part while including controls for a dummy variable identifying
individuals as founders and also while excluding these individuals
altogether. Our results were unchanged.
80 See, e.g., NoAM WASSERMAN, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN
ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAMS: THE FOUNDER GAP, BOARD MEMBERSHIP, & PAY
FOR MILESTONES (2004), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu
nwasserman/entrepcomp-proceedings.pdf (finding that founders receive
less total pay, perhaps because their firm-specific human capital makes
them less attractive to alternative employers).
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have significantly longer tenure on the board of directors.
The median founder in our sample has served nearly thirty
years on the board of his firm.
Table 12 summarizes the average total compensation of
the founders and non-founders in our sample:
TABLE 12: FOUNDING EXECUTIVES' TOTAL COMPENSATION
Founding Non-Founders
Executives
Average Total Y176 million ¥160 million
Compensation
Although on average founders receive slightly higher
levels of total pay than the non-founders among Japan's
most highly paid managers, total compensation between the
two groups of executives is statistically indistinguishable.
8 1
It does not appear that founders still serving as Japanese
executives receive different levels of pay from their non-
founder counterparts.
As we have previously noted, our findings, consistent with
previous empirical study of managerial stock ownership in
Japanese firms, suggest that Japan's top executives own
relatively little stock in their companies. Founders, however,
may have significant stakes in their firms. Do the founding
executives of Japanese companies, unlike non-founder
counterparts, own substantial holdings of stock in their
companies? Table 13 below summarizes the stock ownership
of the executives included in our sample:
81 The means for total compensation for founders and non-founders
are not statistically significantly different, and when we subjected that
result to more extensive multivariate regressions, a dummy variable
indicating whether the executive was a founder generally did not have a
statistically significant correlation coefficient.
[Vol. 2014
EXECUTIVE PAY IN JAPAN




Average Percentage of 10.4%*** 0.6%
Stock Ownership
As Table 13 shows, although founding executives receive
similar levels of pay to their non-founder counterparts, the
founders among Japan's mostly highly compensated
managers retain significant equity stakes in their companies
after the firm is taken public. Within the pool of disclosing
executives, founders own more than ten times as much stock
in the firm as non-founders. We subjected this result to
multivariate regression analysis controlling for differences in
firm size, industry, and the executive's age, tenure, and total
compensation. The results in Table 13 were robust to those
tests. The founders among Japan's most highly paid
managers hold substantially greater stakes in their firms
than their non-founder counterparts.
Because the compensation literature has long argued that
the relationship between pay and performance is established
through executive stock ownership,82 founding executives'
substantial stock holdings-and these executives'
prominence among Japan's most highly-paid corporate
employees-indicates that a substantial fraction of top
executives in Japan are subject to an unusually strong link
between pay and performance. Although the finding that a
substantial proportion of the firms in the economy are
founder firms, and that these founders retain substantial
stock ownership, is not unique to Japan,8 3 the evidence on
82 See Core et al., supra note 21, at 1144.
83 See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family
Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN.
1301, 1302 (2003) (finding that in the United States, family firms
constitute over thirty-five percent of the S&P 500 and own, on average,
nearly eighteen percent of their firms' outstanding equity).
No. 1:111]
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LA W REVIEW
Japanese founders' ownership offers new perspectives on the
relationship between pay and performance in the modern
Japanese firm.
4
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
The first direct evidence on how Japan's most highly
compensated managers are paid reveals striking new detail
on the relationship between corporate governance and
executive pay. In this Part, we describe three implications of
these findings for the study and regulation of executive pay
around the world. First, we explain that lawmakers should
be conscious of the potential interaction between governance
structures and executive compensation arrangements.
Second, we provide a framework for additional research that
may shed further light on the relationship between corporate
governance and executive pay identified here. Finally, we
propose several changes to Japan's new executive pay
disclosure rules that would allow researchers and investors
to draw more meaningful conclusions from the information
that Japanese companies provide.
84 Because, on average, founding executives own more than ten
percent of their companies' stock, it might be argued that the founders
essentially enjoy a control stake, enabling them to exercise control over
governance choices, including the level and structure of executive pay.
While our data offer some evidence in support of that possibility, see supra
text accompanying notes 78-79 (noting that very few firms with founders
have selected the committee-governance structure), other preliminary
tests of that hypothesis were inconclusive. For example, we considered
whether firms with founders would feature lower total pay, or more
performance-sensitive pay, for top executives other than the founder,
reflecting the founder's ability to exercise control over his colleagues'
compensation. We did not, however, find statistically significant
differences between the total compensation, or compensation structures, of
non-founding executives at firms where founders continue to serve on the
board.
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A. Institutional Complementarities of Pay and
Governance
Lawmakers around the world have, over time, gravitated
toward legal intervention on matters of executive
compensation.8 5 The general forms such interventions have
taken-largely centered on outside-director oversight of the
pay-setting process and mandatory disclosure-are fairly
similar. Yet these legal interventions take place against
vastly different pre-existing institutional landscapes, and
those institutional differences may have significant
implications for the effects of those interventions. This
Article has identified a new area-the relationship between
board structure and pay-in which institutional
complementarities appear to play a critical role.
Although Japanese regulators have borrowed heavily
from U.S. corporate law over the past two decades, the pay-
governance link in Japan is still deeply rooted in distinctive
national institutions. The theoretical and empirical
literature on executive compensation, focused heavily on the
United States, must be understood against the backdrop of
the distinctive U.S. institutional context from which it
emerged. Regulators worldwide have borrowed from a
relatively small tool kit in addressing compensation issues,
but the nature of the issues they seek to address, and the
setting for the pay-governance relationship, differ vastly
from country to country.
Thus, to fully evaluate Japan's current approach to
regulation of executive compensation, we must ask a prior
question: would a move toward more performance-based pay
be good for Japanese corporate governance? If one takes the
complementary set of U.S. corporate governance institutions
as a given, the answer is quite clearly yes.8 6 But as we have
shown, the institutional setting for executive pay in Japan is
85 See JOHNSON & BENNETT, supra note 2, at 4.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 9-13 (describing literature
arguing that because agency costs may lead to managerial slack at U.S.
public companies, performance-based compensation may induce managers
to exert more effort).
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very different from that in the United States.87 Thus, it may
be wrong to assume that more performance-based pay would
necessarily lead to improved corporate performance in
Japan.
Moreover, given the two quite different sets of board
structures in Japan, there may not be a single answer to this
question for all Japanese firms. At present, our evidence
shows, the use of performance-based pay in Japan is largely
limited to companies with committees. If managers at
companies with committees are most in need of financial
motivation, this may well be a desirable outcome for
investors. But what if traditional auditor-style firms would
benefit more from enhanced incentives for management,
perhaps because those firms lack the outside directors or
foreign institutional investors who might provide impetus for
greater managerial effort? On the other hand, widespread
adoption of performance-based pay practices may have
unintended consequences for Japanese corporate governance.
For example, without the concomitant adoption of
complementary institutions-such as a relatively robust
external auditing system and an active environment for
private securities litigation-could more performance-based
pay lead to increased and new types of corporate fraud in
Japan?
88
87 See supra Part II.B.
88 Indeed, it is far from clear why the few Japanese executives who
are already accountable to outside directors are more in need of
performance-sensitive pay than those overseen by more traditional
Japanese boardrooms. To the contrary, independent oversight and
performance-sensitive pay might be better theorized as substitutes. If so,
it may not be desirable for firms to simultaneously adopt the committee
structure and performance-sensitive pay. It is well-known that outside
directors lack the familiarity with corporate operations that insiders
typically enjoy, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in
the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1470 (2007), and it may therefore be more
difficult for these directors to detect fraud. But performance-sensitive pay
arrangements may encourage executives to engage in such conduct. See,
e.g., Lynn Bai, James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Lying and Getting
Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action
Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1882 (2010)
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The preliminary evidence presented in this Article
cannot, of course, fully answer these questions. By revealing
the link between governance and pay structures in Japan,
however, this Article has identified an important new
relationship between the design of governance institutions
and the incentives that top managers face in Japanese
corporations. Lawmakers and investors throughout the
world, therefore, should take careful account of the
relationship between governance and executive pay when
considering new interventions on either front. And, as we
explain below, researchers should further explore the
questions of institutional complementarity identified here.
B. Future Research on Governance and Executive Pay
The new insights made possible by Japan's recent
compensation disclosure reform raise fundamental questions
about the determinants of executive pay in Japanese
companies. In this section, we highlight the most pressing
issues for future research.
1. Pay Levels
The comparatively low level of executive compensation in
Japan, regardless of governance structure, is one of the most
striking facts highlighted by our data. 9  From the
perspective of economic theory, this is very puzzling. We
have noted that Japanese boards have few independent
directors, and domestic institutional investors tend to be
passive. The agency model of executive compensation
(noting that, in the United States, "compensation based on firm value is
associated with abnormal accounting accruals and even fraud as
executives try to make sure they" profit from these pay arrangements).
Thus, it cannot be assumed that widespread adoption of performance-
based pay in the Japanese managerial system, without other institutional
reforms, would necessarily be desirable for investors.
89 See supra text accompanying note 61 (noting that the median pay
of Japan's 269 highest-paid managers was approximately one-tenth of the
median pay of the United States' 269 highest-paid managers in 2010); see
also Kaplan, supra note 43, at 534 (describing a similar analysis
comparing managerial pay in Japan to pay practices in the United States).
dominant in the U.S. literature suggests that this would be
an ideal environment for managerial wealth extraction from
shareholders.90  Why don't Japanese executives pay
themselves more?
While our data do not allow us to answer this question
definitively, several potential explanations are consistent
with the individual-level compensation disclosures we have
examined. Significantly, whatever constraints limit
Japanese executive pay appear to be common to all Japanese
managers, regardless of whether they lead a firm with the
traditional auditor system or the new committee system.
One possibility is that the "outrage constraint" on executive
pay is triggered at a lower level of compensation in Japan
than elsewhere as a result of widely held norms about social
equality, possibly buttressed by the comparatively high
degree of ethnic homogeneity in Japan.91
The new individual-level disclosures now provided under
Japanese law should permit future researchers to evaluate
this hypothesis. In particular, future work should test
whether Japanese shareholders-making use of Japan's say-
on-pay system-enforce compliance with these norms by
expressing reservations about large pay packages.
Separately, researchers should consider whether the
existence of the disclosure regime itself is likely to influence
pay practices in Japan. Will learning about how much their
peers earn lead Japanese managers to seek equivalent or
higher levels of pay from their boards? Or will the disclosure
regime limit pay, leading firms to adjust their pay practices
to minimize the number of disclosing executives by
clustering compensation packages just below the disclosure
threshold? Future research taking advantage of more years
of pay disclosures will shed light on the impact of Japan's
disclosure regime on compensation practices. These insights,
90 See supra text accompanying notes 9-12 (describing the literature
on executive compensation in the United States that advances this
argument).
91 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16, at 64-66 (describing the
operation of this "outrage constraint" on U.S. executive compensation-
and the limits of that constraint).
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in turn, should help expose the reasons why Japanese
managers do not seek more lucrative pay packages.
2. Foreign Executives' Compensation
A second striking finding revealed by our analysis that
merits further research is the fact that foreign executives
working for Japanese firms receive much higher levels of
total compensation than their Japanese counterparts-on
average, over forty percent more. This fact is consistent with
the Japanese employment and social norm explanation
tentatively offered above, as these norms plausibly would not
bind foreign executives working at Japanese firms. But
beyond social norms, whatever their strength, comparatively
high pay for foreign executives in Japan suggests that simple
labor market forces heavily influence Japanese pay.
Simply put, it may be that while non-Japanese executives
operate in a global market for managerial talent, most
Japanese executives are confined to the domestic market.
(Not a single Japanese CEO leads a non-Japanese Global
Fortune 500 company). Thus, while foreign executives' pay
is influenced by global market standards, Japanese
executives may be paid according to a much lower domestic
scale. To date, very little research has been done on the
relationship between global labor markets for executive
talent, executive compensation, and corporate governance
structures.92 Our study suggests that this is a fruitful area
for further research.
92 There is a small literature on the impact of geography on executive
pay, but it relies exclusively on U.S. data. See Christa H.S. Bouwman,
The Geography of Executive Compensation (June 2013) (unpublished
working paper), http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/bouwman/downloads/
BouwmanGeographyOfExecComp.pdf; Simi Kedia & Shivaram Rajgopal,
Neighborhood Matters: The Impact of Location on Broad Based Stock
Option Plans, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 109 (2009).
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3. The Link Between Corporate Governance and
Pay Structure
While labor market factors may explain the large
disparity between Japanese and non-Japanese executive pay
within Japanese firms, they do not address the potentially
most important result of our analysis-the existence of
significant differences in the composition of executive pay
between traditional auditor firms and committee firms.
What accounts for the existence of parallel compensation
regimes operating within Japan? While only additional
research can provide a definitive answer to this important
question, we outline four possible explanations in order to
frame the future research effort.
First, compensation practices may be endogenous to firm
structure. Just as the selection of board structure may be
driven by each firm's particular industrial organization,9"
compensation practices may be based on firm-specific
determinations of the most efficient managerial incentive
structures. There may simply be two different types of firms
in our data set; efficiency concerns led firms with one
constellation of characteristics to retain seniority-based pay
practices, while similar concerns led firms with a different
constellation of characteristics to adopt performance-based
pay structures. While endogeneity cannot be ruled out, it
does not find support in our data. Performance-based pay
practices are significantly correlated with the committee
structure even after controlling for other variables that may
systematically distinguish the firms in our data set.
Similarly, recent empirical research finds little support for
endogeneity in Japanese board structure. 94  Nevertheless,
because our data do not permit us to rule out this
explanation, future work should seek to isolate the
relationship between governance and pay from other firm
characteristics.
93 See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 362 (drawing on the
insights of Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate
Ownership, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985)).
94 See Eberhart, supra note 42, at 188-89.
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Second, firms may choose performance-based pay to
signal adherence to global governance standards that are, or
at least are perceived to be, superior to Japanese practices.
Performance-based pay may be associated with the
committee system and outside directors because together
they constitute a complementary package of institutions
widely perceived outside Japan to deliver higher quality
corporate governance than insider-dominated boards and
pay packages without significant performance-based
incentives. Several results of our empirical analysis support
this signaling hypothesis. For example, as compared to
auditor firms, committee firms have a higher percentage of
foreign stockholders, and a lower percentage of ownership by
traditionally management-friendly shareholders (Japanese
banks and corporate shareholders). While only two founder
firms in our data set have adopted the committee system,
these firms seem comfortable with-and have reasons to
signal adherence to-global governance norms.95  The
signaling theory of executive pay is also consistent with
research showing that the committee system confers a value
advantage (in the form of Tobin's Q) as compared to the
auditor system. 6 Future empirical research should explore
whether governance and compensation choices allow
Japanese firms to signal their credibility to outsiders.
Third, it is possible that investors view performance-
based compensation as part of a familiar and generally
desirable package of governance arrangements. Because
investors generally lack the time or incentive to scrutinize
these arrangements, they may simply demand the wholesale
adoption of an "off-the-rack" package of structures. And,
95 Approximately fifty-seven percent of Eisai's sales are generated
outside Japan and its CEO, Haruo Naito, has an MBA from the Kellogg
School of Management. Foreign investors, including JPMorgan Chase and
Deutsche Bank, own fifty-four percent of Hoya stock, and Hoya has several
independent directors on its board, including a non-Japanese board
member.
96 See generally Eberhart, supra note 42 (finding a significant increase
in firm valuation for Japanese companies that adopted the committee
system).
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because investors likely have more influence on the decisions
of companies overseen by independent committees than more
traditional Japanese firms, they may be more likely to
succeed in convincing boards with an American-style
governance structure to adopt that package. In contrast to
the signaling explanation, in which the corporation's agents
seek to identify themselves as adhering to global governance
norms, this explanation places the impetus for adoption of
more performance-based pay practices on investors. Future
research in this area should explore the potential link
between increased investor influence and the adoption of
performance-based pay arrangements.
Fourth, performance-based pay may result from the
operation of the committee system itself. Recall that a
compensation committee comprised of a majority of outside
directors is required of companies-with-committees.
Independent directors, representing shareholder interests,
may be bargaining with managers to ensure that their
compensation is closely tied to shareholder wealth. That is,
the committee structure may provide a better mechanism for
creating performance-linked compensation packages than
the auditor system.
Our data, drawn from just a single year of disclosures, do
not allow us to rule out any of these explanations. They do,
however, highlight the pressing need for research into the
actual mechanisms through which governance and executive
pay are related in Japan. And, because Japanese companies
are free to alter-and, in fact, have altered-both their
governance and compensation structures over time, the
heterogeneous combination of governance and pay
arrangements should provide a rich environment for
researchers to explore these questions.
C. Japanese Regulation of Executive Compensation
As we have noted, significant additional study is
necessary to understand fully the relationship between
corporate governance and executive pay - in Japan and
elsewhere. Unfortunately, however, Japan's new disclosure
rules are unlikely to provide investors, policymakers, and
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researchers with all of the information necessary to evaluate
those questions.
In most jurisdictions, including in the United States,
compensation disclosure must be provided for those
executives with the most influence over corporate decisions -
including especially the chief executive and chief financial
officers of the firm.97 Although this approach is not without
its drawbacks, it provides investors with compensation
information for the managers most likely to influence the
firm and its value.98
Japan, however, has not taken this approach. Instead,
Japanese law requires disclosure of compensation only for
executives earning more than Y100 million.99 In addition to
being arbitrary, in view of the comparatively low levels of
executive pay in Japan, this threshold triggers disclosures by
only a small number of executives, at a fraction of all
publicly traded Japanese firms. Moreover, since "exorbitant"
levels of executive pay-however that term might be
understood-is not a currently a problem in Japan, the
additional data resulting from the focus on Japan's most
highly compensated executives does not appear to address a
pressing public policy issue.100 And limiting disclosure to
97 For the American rule, see Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)
(2013) (requiring disclosure of compensation arrangements for the Chief
Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and the three other highest-
paid executive officers of the firm).
98 For an assessment of the history of this approach in the United
States, and its effect on managerial incentives, see Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Stock Unloading and Banker Incentives, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 951, 955
(2012) (finding that disclosure requirements imposed upon public-company
executives deter managers from diversifying their holdings of company
stock, with both salutary and troubling implications).
99 See Wakabayashi, supra note 45.
100 We acknowledge, of course, that Japanese regulators may be
attempting to accomplish objectives unrelated to investors' interests by
requiring disclosure of executive compensation. See supra note 52. If so,
however, it is unclear what those objectives are, and how they would be
served by the disclosure regime that Japanese regulators have chosen.
Moreover, whether or not regulators hoped to accomplish other goals by
requiring disclosure of executives' pay, these rules might also serve the
important purpose of providing investors with information relevant to the
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this group of executives poses nontrivial methodological
problems for researchers, whose work might provide policy-
relevant insights. 10 1
Downward revision of the disclosure threshold may thus
be useful, not only to researchers interested in the expansion
of academic knowledge, but to investors and regulators with
concrete concerns about how Japanese firms are run.
Alternatively, the disclosure obligation could be revised in
the manner of the U.S. federal securities laws, which
emphasize disclosure for the managers who exercise
significant control over the firm and its operations,
regardless of the level of their compensation. Either reform
would allow the Japanese disclosure regime to give
researchers and investors information more useful to the
understanding of corporate governance and executive
compensation.
Beyond the context of executive compensation, we note
that our study offers insight as to whether Japanese
corporate governance practices are changing in response to
over a decade of significant legal reforms and exposure to
global market forces-a question on which commentators are
currently divided. Many are skeptical. For example, in
previous work, one of us concluded that, based on evidence
from the first year of adoptions of the committee structure,
introduction of the committee system was not a meaningful
governance reform. 10 2 Another recent study has concluded
that "Japan's 'traditional' style of corporate governance has
emerged relatively unscathed from its contact with 'global
standards."' 10 3  A separate view is that Japanese firms
governance of Japanese public companies. As we explain in the text,
relatively minor changes to these rules would bring the regime
significantly closer to serving this purpose.
101 As we have noted, the limitations of the dataset make it
impossible to draw definitive conclusions about pay practices at all
publicly traded Japanese firms. Although we have taken steps to address
the potential bias in our sample, we cannot completely rule out the
possibility that sample bias affected our results.
102 See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 370-71.
103 John Buchanan & Simon Deakin, In the Shadow of Corporate
Governance Reform: Change and Continuity in Managerial Practice at
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adhering to the auditor structure have been able to copy
important features of the committee firms so as to diminish
the differential effects between the two governance
systems.1 " Still other commentators, most prominently
Ronald Dore, lament that Japanese managers have
abandoned more traditional governance structures. He
claims that "after less than two decades of missionary
activity [by adherents of the Anglo-Saxon model], the
conversion of Japan to the theology of shareholder
sovereignty seems complete.
°1 0 5
The evidence presented in this Article provides a more
nuanced perspective. Traditional boardroom practices
plainly still prevail in Japan, but they are no longer
ubiquitous. A small group of firms has broken away in favor
of governance structures, including compensation practices,
resembling those prevalent in the United States. Much more
research into the impact of the new structures is needed.
But the early evidence does not support the claim that
Japanese corporate governance has been unaffected by
global standards. Nor does it support the view that
traditionally governed Japanese firms have successfully
mimicked all of the important innovations of committee
firms. In short, the evidence suggests that Japan's
conversion to shareholder sovereignty to date has been
partial and limited, not wholehearted. At the same time,
however, executive pay in Japan indicates that Japanese
corporate governance practices-and not just formal laws-
are being influenced by global market forces.
Listed Companies in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL
CHANGE IN JAPAN 28, 45 (D. Hugh Whittaker & Simon Deakin eds., 2009).
See also Tadashi Araki, Changes in Japan's Practice-Dependent
Stakeholder Model and Employee-Centered Corporate Governance, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL CHANGE IN JAPAN, supra, at 222,
226 ("changes have occurred to the legal framework, but traditional
practices remain firmly in place.").
104 Eberhart, supra note 42, at 180.
105 Ronald Dore, Japan's Conversion to Investor Capitalism, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL CHANGE IN JAPAN, supra note
103, at 134, 161.
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V. CONCLUSION
Lawmakers around the world have increasingly insisted
that publicly traded corporations adopt corporate governance
and executive pay standards that draw heavily on the
American corporate-law context. Little is known, however,
about how these standards influence corporate actors
abroad-and how they interact with each other in the vastly
different regulatory environments in which they have been
adopted.
In this Article, we have provided the first direct empirical
evidence on the magnitude and structure of executive pay for
Japan's most highly compensated executives. The data
provide a glimpse of an important, and previously
unappreciated, relationship between corporate governance
and executive pay in Japan. Firms that have adopted a
committee-based structure for their corporate boards have
also adopted performance-based pay structures familiar to
American corporate law. And at these firms, boards appear
far more prepared to provide executives with pay that
corresponds to the size of the firm than their counterparts at
more traditional Japanese companies.
The evidence also indicates that global markets are an
increasingly important determinant of executive pay inside
Japan. Non-Japanese executives earn significantly more
than their Japanese counterparts. And the data also show
that founding executives are frequently among Japan's
highest-paid executives. Because these managers have
generally maintained significant ownership of their
companies, the link between pay and performance at many
Japanese firms may be far stronger than has been previously
suggested.
Although the evidence presented here points to important
paths for future research, the data offer only a snapshot of
the complex institutional interactions between governance
and compensation structures outside the United States. To
the extent that lawmakers continue to import American-
style corporate-governance rules into foreign markets, much
closer empirical study of the benefits-and potential costs-
of the convergence of global governance will be needed.
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APPENDIX
The evidence presented in the Article is based on data
drawn by hand from filings that public companies were
required to provide in 2010 pursuant to the revised Japanese
disclosure ordinance made effective in that year. All of the
filings used to assemble the dataset are publicly available,




Drawing on public filings by all 152 Japanese firms with
executives subject to the compensation-disclosure ordinance
in 2010, we hand-collected information for all 269 executives
for whom compensation was revealed. The data included
information on the salary, bonus, stock options, retirement
benefits, and other compensation paid to each individual.
We supplemented this information with additional detail on
the characteristics of each executive in our sample. We also
supplemented the dataset with information on the
characteristics of each firm.
a. Executive Characteristics
In addition to compensation information, we
supplemented our dataset with biographical information on
each executive. As noted in the Article, we drew information
on each executive's tenure in her role as well as her stock
ownership. We also used details disclosed in the Yuka
Shoken Hokokushko to determine whether each executive
was a non-Japanese serving as an executive at a Japanese
firm and whether the executive was a founder of the
company.
b. Firm Characteristics
We also supplemented our dataset with firm
characteristics likely to be relevant to executive pay.
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Drawing from both the new disclosures and the Yuka Shoken
Hokokushko, we collected information on each firm's size (as
measured by market capitalization), use of the poison pill,
governance structure, firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q),
the percentage of each firm's revenue derived from Japan,
the percentage of each firm's shares owned by foreign
investors, the number of directors on the company's board,
and the number of employees at each firm. As explained
below, we used these data to control for firm-specific
characteristics when analyzing the relationships described in
the Article.
2. Firms Subject to Disclosure
As we have noted, in 2010 the revised ordinance applied
only to the 152 firms with executives earning more than
Y100 million per year. Thus, it is possible that these firms
are meaningfully different than other public companies in
Japan-that is, that the companies in our sample may not be
representative of Japanese public companies more generally.
Because we cannot observe individuals' pay at firms not
subject to the ordinance, we cannot rule out this source of
sample bias. As one check, however, we created a separate,
hand-drawn dataset of comparable firms that were not
subject to the ordinance in 2010. The comparable dataset
consisted of 116 firms chosen by industry to match the
distribution of industries among the firms that were
required to disclose in 2010. We then compared the 152
firms required to disclose with these 116 firms across eight
firm-level characteristics, including, among others, firm size,
use of the poison pill, governance structure, and firm value.
T-tests of the means across these characteristics indicated no
statistically significant differences between the group of
firms that was subject to the ordinance and the group that
was not. As a preliminary matter, then, the firms required
to disclose under the ordinance do not seem to be statistically
significantly different from other public companies in Japan,
at least with respect to these observable firm-level
characteristics.
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Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the truncated nature
of our sample counsels caution in the interpretation of our
results. Thus, for reference, we have included in Table I
below the list of firms that were subject to the ordinance in
2010, and therefore included in our dataset:

















Dai Nippon Printing Co.
Daiichi Sankyo Co.
Dakin Industries
Dainichiska Col. & Chems. Mfg. Co.


























































Namo Baindai Holdings Inc.
Nour Shipbuilding Co.
NGK Insulators




Nippon Suison Kaisha, Ltd.
Nissan Motor Co.
Nissin Foods Holdings Co.
Nippon Sheet Glass Co.
Nomura Holdings, Inc.
NSK Ltd.




















Sega Sammy Holdings Inc.
ShiDax Corp.
Shin Nippon Biomed. Labs. Co.
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co.






































Below we present the results of multivariate regressions
explaining the relationships described in the Article.
Because our sample is unbalanced with respect to firm-that
is, some firms were required to disclose compensation for
more than one executive, and thus some firms are featured
in more than one observation in our dataset-all standard
errors are clustered by firm. Mean values and standard
errors are presented in parentheses. In the tables below,
significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent are indicated by
**, and *, respectively.
1. Performance Pay and Governance in Japan
To estimate the relationship between governance
structures and the extent to which executive pay is linked to
performance, we specified a multivariate regression model in
which the dependent variable is the percentage of an
executive's total compensation attributable to performance-
based pay, which includes bonuses and grants of stock and
stock options (mean: 22.65%). We code the firm's governance
structure as a dummy variable, where 1 represents firms
with the traditional statutory-auditor structure and 0
represents firms that have adopted the committee structure.
Each model includes a linear control for industry (model (a)
in the Tables below) or industry fixed effects (model (b)), and
all models include controls for Tobin's Q, the percentage of
firm stock owned by banks10 6 and the executive's total
compensation; correlation coefficients were insignificant
across all models and are excluded for concision. To address
concerns that our results were related to outliers in our
dataset, we separately ran each of the regressions below, in
each case transforming the dependent variable to reflect the
log of the percentage of the executive's pay attributable to
106 Because the structure of a company's equity ownership is
generally thought to be relevant to both the level and structure of
executive pay, see Jackson, supra note 52 at 658-59 fig. 1, in unreported
analysis we separately controlled for the level of institutional ownership in
our companies more generally. Our results were unchanged from those
described in Tables 2 and 3. However, because bank ownership is
generally thought to be highly relevant for purposes of Japanese corporate
governance, see Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, Banks and Corporate
Control in Japan, 54 J. FIN. 319, 320 (1999), we present the results of
models controlling exclusively for bank ownership in the companies in our
sample.
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performance-based compensation. Our results were
unchanged.
As noted above, we separately coded each executive with
respect to whether she was a foreign executive, a founder, or
retired. Each of those characteristics is reflected in dummy
controls in the models below. We also separately ran each of
the regressions below, first excluding founding executives
and then excluding foreign executives. The results were
unchanged, and below we report correlation coefficients and
significance from the entire sample of 269 executives.
TABLE II: PERFORMANCE PAY AND GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN
Percentage of Pay Percentage of Pay









Executive Tenure on -.004** -.004*







Adjusted R2 0.25 0.41
2. Pay Equity Inside the Japanese Boardroom
To explore the relationship among the difference between
top executives' pay and the pay of the average director, firm
size, and corporate governance, we specify multivariate
regression models in which the dependent variable is the gap
between the disclosed executive's total compensation and the
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average director's pay at that executive's firm, and including
in each model an interaction term between firm size and
governance, again coding governance as a dummy variable
where 1 represents firms with the traditional statutory-
auditor structure and 0 represents firms that have adopted
the committee structure. All models include controls for
Tobin's Q; correlation coefficients were insignificant across
all models and are excluded for concision. All models also
include controls for the executive's status as a foreigner, as a
founder, or as a retired executive, as well as the percentage
of firm stock owned by banks; correlation coefficients are
excluded for concision. To address concerns that our results
were related to outliers in our dataset, we re-ran each of the
regressions below, in each case transforming the dependent
variable to reflect the log of the percentage of the executive's
pay attributable to performance-based compensation. Our
results were unchanged.
To further address the concern that our results were
skewed by the sample bias inherent in our dataset, 10 7 we
separately re-ran the analysis below including only the
single highest-paid executive at each firm. Our results were
unchanged, and below we report results from the entire
sample of executives.
107 See supra Appendix A.2.
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TABLE III: PAY EQUITY INSIDE THE JAPANESE BOARDROOM
Gap Between Gap Between
Disclosed Executive Disclosed Executive
and Average Director and Average Director
(109.1) (a) (109.1) (b)







Capitalization * -51.73*** -47.30***
Governance (13.75) (40.87)
Structure
Industry Fixed No Yes
Effects?
Observations 269 269
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.25
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